University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review
Volume 40
Issue 4 The Ben J. Altheimer Symposium: The
Law and Unnatural Disasters: Legal Adaptations
to Climate Change

Article 1

2018

Harvey, Irma, and the NFIP: Did the 2017 Hurricane Season Matter
to Flood Insurance Reauthorization?
Robin Kundis Craig

Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Insurance Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Robin Kundis Craig, Harvey, Irma, and the NFIP: Did the 2017 Hurricane Season Matter to Flood Insurance
Reauthorization?, 40 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 481 (2018).
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol40/iss4/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has
been accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen
Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu.

HARVEY, IRMA, AND THE NFIP: DID THE 2017 HURRICANE
SEASON MATTER TO FLOOD INSURANCE REAUTHORIZATION?
Robin Kundis Craig*
I. INTRODUCTION
In April 2014, Farmers Insurance Company filed nine high-profile
class-action lawsuits on behalf of itself, other insurance companies, and
policyholders with damaged properties against approximately 200 Chicagoarea municipalities, arguing that those municipalities were failing to deal
with climate change.1 Specifically, Farmers Insurance alleged that these
cities and counties were aware that climate change was leading to heavier
rains but were failing to upgrade their water infrastructure—especially
sewers and stormwater drains—in response.2 The lawsuit came almost
exactly one year after the Democratic Governor of Illinois, Pat Quinn,
declared a state of emergency in the face of unprecedented rains that flooded
Chicago, overwhelmed sewers, created “geysers of wastewater,” and turned
city streets into rivers navigable by kayak and canoe.3 The losses from the
spring 2013 flooding totaled at least $218 million—and much of that loss
was covered by insurance.4
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1. Ari Phillips, In Landmark Class Action, Farmers Insurance Sues Local Governments
for Ignoring Climate Change, THINKPROGRESS (May 19, 2014, 4:51 PM), https://think
progress.org/in-landmark-class-action-farmers-insurance-sues-local-governments-forignoring-climate-change-19c31eef042e#.q33quzenc.
2. Id. The municipalities acquired this knowledge, the lawsuit further claimed, through
a 2008 climate change action plan and a 2011 report from the regional water management
authority detailing the deficiencies. See Gail Sullivan, Climate Change: Get Ready or Get
Sued, WASH. POST (May 19, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp
/2014/05/19/climate-change-get-ready-or-get-sued/?utm_term=.609be5771e1f.
3. Sullivan, supra note 2.
4. Rob Wile, An Insurance Company Is Suing 200 Illinois Towns for Not Being Better
Prepared for Climate Change, BUS. INSIDER (May 18, 2014, 7:24 PM), http://www.
businessinsider.com/farmers-sues-towns-over-climate-damage-2014-5.
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Farmers Insurance dropped its lawsuits in early June of 2014, claiming
that the filing itself was enough to accomplish its primary goal—bringing
climate change financial realities to the municipalities’ attention.5 Indeed, its
lawsuits did serve to highlight the potential role of insurance in climate
change adaptation. For example, ThinkProgress noted in May 2014 that:
Insurance companies are becoming increasingly concerned, and more
vocal, about the rising costs of climate change. With large fossil fuel
companies reluctant to take greenhouse gas mitigation efforts in the face
of potential profit losses, the behemoth insurance industry could provide
a counterbalance to the energy industry when it comes to incentivizing
near-term emissions cuts, or at least adaptation to the effects of climate
change.6

The Christian Science Monitor similarly reported that “insurance
companies are vocal about the rising costs of global warming and want to
push cities to invest in prevention as a way to avoid future lawsuits.”7
Somewhat perversely, however, one of the immediate state responses to
Farmers Insurance’s lawsuits was to strengthen governments’ immunity
from such tort liability.8
The fact that the law can create incentives is well-documented in the
literature;9 indeed, creating incentives to guide human behavior is often one
of law’s primary goals and purposes.10 However, legal incentives can also
become perverse,11 especially in environmental and natural resource
regulation.12
5. Robert McCoppin, Insurance Company Drops Suits over Chicago-Area Flooding,
CHI. TRIB. (June 3, 2014, 6:52 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/chichicago-flooding-insurance-lawsuit-20140603-story.html.
6. Phillips, supra note 1.
7. Mica Rosenberg, Climate Change Lawsuits Filed Against Some 200 US
Communities, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (May 17, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/
Environment/Latest-News-Wires/2014/0517/Climate-change-lawsuits-filed-against-some200-US-communities.
8. David Ormsby, Climate Change Lawsuits Could Again Haunt Illinois Cities,
HUFFINGTON POST: BLOG (July 30, 2014, 10:05 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/davidormsby/climate-change-lawsuits-c_b_5631969.html.
9. E.g., Todd D. Rakoff, Social Structure, Legal Structure, and Default Rules: A
Comment, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 19, 25 (1993); Lynn D. Wardle, Dilemmas of
Indissoluble Parenthood: Legal Incentives, Parenting, and the Work-Life Balance, 26 BYU J.
PUB. L. 265, 296, 299 (2012).
10. E.g., Jason Scott Johnston, Uncertainty, Chaos, and the Torts Process: An Economic
Analysis of Legal Form, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 34849 (1991).
11. Wardle, supra note 9, at 265.
12. E.g., J. Peter Byrne, Precipice Regulations and Perverse Incentives: Comparing
Historic Preservation and Endangered Species Listing, 27 GEOGRAPHIC INT’L ENVTL. L. REV.
343, 34446 (2015); Byron Swift, How Environmental Laws Work: An Analysis of the Utility
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Insurance operates primarily to mitigate risk.13 By changing the costs or
potential costs to private actors of certain behaviors, insurance makes those
behaviors less risky to specific individuals by effectively spreading the costs
over a larger population of at-risk individuals, not all of whom will actually
suffer harm.14 As a result, insurance can directly incentivize actions—like
living on the coast—that would otherwise be too risky for anyone except the
extremely wealthy to undertake.15
Both the law and the availability of insurance have been instrumental
in promoting coastal development. This article focuses on the National
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and its relationship to coastal hurricanes,
arguing that the NFIP provides a quintessential example of perverse legal
incentives for the coast in a climate change era. By allowing homeowners
both to pay below-market insurance rates and to recover multiple times for
flooded properties, the NFIP incentivizes development of the floodplains
and coast—two geographic areas where climate change adaptation strategies
would benefit from legal incentives for infrastructure withdrawals. Instead,
the NFIP is increasingly becoming a “National Hurricane Insurance
Program,” with major hurricanes along the Gulf and East Coasts of the
United States driving most of the program’s major payouts. Hurricanerelated payouts are a significant reason why the NFIP is close to bankruptcy.
In addition, the prominence of hurricanes in NFIP payouts is also creating
regional tensions, with western states largely subsidizing states on the Gulf
and East Coasts.
The NFIP came up for reauthorization in 2017—just as the United
States was experiencing its worst hurricane season in over a decade. As a
result, this most recent reauthorization process offers a window into how—
or whether—Congress is thinking about the relationships among climate
change, insurance incentives, and federal fiscal liabilities. This article begins
with an overview of the NFIP and its intensifying relationship with coastal
hurricanes.16 Part III reviews the 2017 hurricane season, including the
implications of Hurricanes Harvey and Irma for the NFIP. 17 Part IV then
examines the NFIP reauthorization process in more detail, focusing on
House Bill 2874, “The 21st Century Flood Reform Act,” which the House
Sector’s Response to Regulation of Nitrogen Oxides and Sulfur Dioxide Under the Clean Air
Act, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 393 n.390 (2001).
13. Qihao He, Mitigation of Climate Change Risks and Regulation by Insurance: A
Feasible Proposal for China, 43 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 319, 325 (2016); Edward P.
Richards, Applying Life Insurance Principles to Coastal Property Insurance to Incentivize
Adaptation to Climate Change, 43 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 427, 430 (2016).
14. He, supra note 13, at 32425; Richards, supra note 13, at 431.
15. Richards, supra note 13, at 428.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part III.
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of Representatives passed in November 2017 and which is still awaiting a
Senate response.18 The article concludes that, while Congress appears to be
taking some important steps toward recognizing the vulnerability of coasts,
it could still do much more to transform the NFIP into a program that
actively promotes climate change adaptation.19
II. THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM
Congress enacted the NFIP in 1968 specifically because private
insurance companies would not cover flood-prone properties. Today, coastal
property owners are both the primary beneficiaries and the primary
bankrupters of the program, particularly because of growing numbers of
increasingly expensive losses caused by hurricanes. Given that climate
change is expected to increase both the frequency and the severity of these
costly coastal storms, it is worth re-examining the NFIP’s role in the
Anthropocene.
A.

Overview of the National Flood Insurance Program

After decades of being able to provide only post-disaster relief to flood
victims, Congress enacted the NFIP in an attempt to provide more proactive
federal flood protection.20 After Hurricane Betsy devastated the Gulf of
Mexico coast in 1965, Congress enacted the Southeast Hurricane Disaster
Relief Act,21 which authorized an insurance feasibility study.22 The resulting
1966 study recommended a federal flood insurance program, 23 and in 1968
Congress created the NFIP through the National Flood Insurance Act
(NFIA).24 The primary purposes of the NFIP are to “[b]etter indemnify
individuals for flood losses through insurance; [r]educe future flood
damages through State and community floodplain management regulations;

18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Part V.
20. FED. INS. & MITIGATION ADMIN., FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, NATIONAL
FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: PROGRAM DESCRIPTION 1 (2002), https://www.fema.gov
/media-library-data/20130726-1447-20490-2156/nfipdescrip_1_.pdf [hereinafter 2002 FEMA
NFIP OVERVIEW].
21. Southeast Hurricane Disaster Relief Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-339, 79 Stat. 1301
(Nov. 8, 1965).
22. Sarah Fox, This Is Adaptation: The Elimination of Subsidies Under the National
Flood Insurance Program, 39 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 205, 213–14 (2014); see also 2002 FEMA
NFIP OVERVIEW, supra note 20, at 12 (providing a similar history).
23. 2002 FEMA NFIP OVERVIEW, supra note 20, at 2.
24. Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476, 572 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
4001–4131 (2014)).
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and [r]educe Federal expenditures for disaster assistance and flood
control.”25
Unlike most private insurance, the NFIP directs its incentive structures
toward municipalities, not private behavior. Specifically, the NFIP uses
insurance coverage as an incentive to local governments to encourage them
to regulate land use and building requirements that reduce flood damage,
enabling “property owners in participating communities to purchase
insurance as a protection against flood losses in exchange for State and
community floodplain management regulations that reduce future flood
damages.”26 As such, unlike much traditional property insurance, the NFIP
generally focuses less on how individual property owners behave than on
how municipalities regulate: “If a community adopts and enforces a
floodplain management ordinance to reduce future flood risk to new
construction in floodplains, the Federal Government will make flood
insurance available within the community as a financial protection against
flood losses.”27
The NFIP does, however, seek to make both governments and
individuals more cognizant of flooding risks. For example, the NFIP
requires the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to identify
and map floodplains, which “creates broad-based awareness of the flood
hazards and provides the data needed for floodplain management programs
and to actuarially rate new construction for flood insurance.”28 Since the
1973 amendments, the NFIP also requires property owners to purchase flood
insurance if they live in a Special Flood Hazard Area and have a mortgage
from a federally backed or regulated lender.29 As FEMA explains:
The 1973 Act required that Federal agencies and federally insured or
regulated lenders had to require flood insurance on all grants and loans
for acquisition or construction of buildings in designated Special Flood
Hazard Areas (SFHAs) in communities that participate in the NFIP. This
requirement is referred to as the Mandatory Flood Insurance Purchase
Requirement. The SFHA is that land within the floodplain of a
community subject to a 1 percent or greater chance of flooding in any
given year, commonly referred to as the 100-year flood.30
25. 2002 FEMA NFIP OVERVIEW, supra note 20, at 2.
26. Id. at 1.
27. Id.; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., FLOOD INSURANCE: REVIEW OF
FEMA STUDY AND REPORT ON COMMUNITY-BASED OPTIONS 4 (2016), http://www.gao.gov
/assets/680/679214.pdf.
28. 2002 FEMA NFIP OVERVIEW, supra note 20, at 2.
29. A. Dan Tarlock & Deborah M. Chizewer, Living with Water in a Climate-Changed
World: Will Federal Flood Policy Sink or Swim?, 46 ENVTL. L. 491, 506 (2016); 2002 FEMA
NFIP OVERVIEW, supra note 20, at 3.
30. 2002 FEMA NFIP OVERVIEW, supra note 20, at 3.
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In 2009, the federal government issued 5,700,235 flood insurance
policies to individual homeowners within communities participating in the
NFIP, which was the highest number of policies issued in a given year.31
While the number of issued policies has slightly declined since 2009, the
federal government still issues over five million flood insurance policies
every year.32
As perhaps is befitting of legislation prompted most directly by a
hurricane, property owners in coastal states are the primary beneficiaries of
the NFIP. Of the states where more than 60,000 NFIP policies were in force
in 2016, for example, all but Pennsylvania (64,588 policies) are coastal
states.33 In descending order by number of policies, these states include
Florida (1,813,592), Texas (589,357), Louisiana (452,680), California
(304,388), New Jersey (233,789), South Carolina (201,373), New York
(188,530), North Carolina (130,258), Virginia (106,005), Georgia (89,295),
Maryland (68,386), Mississippi (66,169), Massachusetts (64,689), and
Hawaii (60,199).34
B.

The NFIP on the Coasts

Originally, the NFIP’s goal was to “mov[e] people out of harm’s way,”
but it has “morphed into a program that moved them right into harm’s way,
indeed paying them with cheap insurance to move [to flood prone areas.]”35
As scholars have emphasized, “[b]y providing subsidized flood insurance to
coastal properties, the NFIP encourages Americans to purchase property on
the coast.”36 Moreover, while the NFIP still encourages better building codes
and land use regulation along the coast, those measures are often inadequate.
For example, raised houses in New Orleans were still “smashed by walls of
water fifteen- to twenty-feet high” during Hurricane Katrina.37

31. Total Policies in Force by Calendar Year, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/totalpolicies-force-calendar-year (last updated Apr. 6, 2018).
32. Id.; see, e.g., UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, OVERWHELMING RISK: RETHINKING
FLOOD INSURANCE IN A WORLD OF RISING SEAS 7 fig. 4 (2013), https://www.ucsusa.org
/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/global_warming/Overwhelming-Risk-FullReport.pdf (“At the end of 2012, NFIP provided more than 5.6 million insurance policies,
insuring $1.25 trillion in assets but collecting only $3.6 billion in total premiums.”).
33. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 27, at 7 fig. 1.
34. Id.
35. Oliver A. Houck, Retaking the Exam: How Environmental Law Failed New Orleans
and the Gulf Coast South and How It Might Yet Succeed, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1059, 1078–79
(2007).
36. Jenna Shweitzer, Climate Change Legal Remedies: Hurricane Sandy and New York
City Coastal Adaptation, 16 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 243, 24950 (2014).
37. Houck, supra note 35, at 1078–79.

2018]

HARVEY, IRMA, AND NFIP REAUTHORIZATION

487

Repetitive-loss properties are the primary evidence of the NFIP’s
perverse incentive structure because they represent the program’s
facilitation of rebuilding in risky areas, rather than encouraging property
owners to migrate inland.38 These properties are also an important cause of
the NFIP’s insolvency. According to the Union of Concerned Scientists,
“NFIP has paid out almost $9 billion in claims to repetitive-loss properties,
which amounts to about a quarter of all payments since 1978. Repetitiveloss properties . . . account for just 1.3 percent of all policies but are
responsible for fully 25 percent of all NFIP claim payments since 1978.”39
Some of the individual stories defy common sense. As three examples,
some properties have made over forty claims each; “[o]ne property in
Houston received 16 payouts totaling $806,591, more than seven times the
structure’s value;” and “[o]ne house in Alabama, valued at $153,000, has
received $2.25 million in NFIP payouts.”40 As of April 2016, FEMA had
identified approximately 11,900 remaining NFIP-insured properties that
qualify as severe repetitive-loss properties,41 up from approximately 9,000
such properties identified in 2011.42
Notably, coastal properties dominate repetitive loss payments from the
NFIP—that is, repeat payments resulting from more than one flooding
disaster.43 While amendments to the NFIP in 2004 allowed the federal

38. Jan Ellen Spiegel, CT’s Repeat Flood Damage Dilemma: Move Out or Rebuild?, CT
MIRROR (Oct. 9, 2015), https://ctmirror.org/2015/10/09/cts-repeat-flood-damage-dilemmamove-out-or-rebuild/ (“[S]horeline and climate experts, public officials and others have
grown increasingly critical of [programs like the NFIP that insure repetitive losses along
coasts], arguing that they encourage rebuilding in places that have already shown themselves
to be flood-prone and are likely to become more so because of climate change. . . .”).
39. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 32, at 9 fig. 6; see also Erika Bolstad,
Insurance May Be Dropped for Properties That Repeatedly Flood, SCI. AM. (Sept. 29, 2016),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/insurance-may-be-dropped-for-properties-thatrepeatedly-flood/ (“Properties that flood repeatedly represent about 1 percent of the total
policies of the program but add up to 25 to 30 percent of the claims. They also represent
about $12 billion of the program’s $23 billion debt.”).
40. U.C. Davis Center for Watershed Sciences, California, Flood Risk, and the National
Flood Insurance Program, CAL. WATERBLOG (Dec. 14, 2016), https://californiawaterblog.
com/2016/12/14/california-flood-risk-and-the-national-flood-insurance-program/.
41. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., GUIDANCE FOR
SEVERE REPETITIVE LOSS PROPERTIES 1 (2016), https://www.fema.gov/media-librarydata/1458756489938-3dc4734e1bf9db98026948383a4493eb/21_srl_508_apr2016.pdf;
cf.
U.C. Davis Center for Watershed Sciences, supra note 40 (placing the number of repetitiveloss properties in 2016 at more than 30,000).
42. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., GUIDANCE FOR
SEVERE REPETITIVE LOSS PROPERTIES 1 (2011), https://www.fema.gov/pdf/nfip/manual
201205/content/20_srl.pdf.
43. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 32, at 9 fig. 6.
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government to buy out repetitive-loss property owners,44 repetitive-loss
coastal properties have become political and financial issues in
Connecticut,45 Florida,46 Louisiana,47 and Texas.48
Nevertheless, the NFIP remains a significant reason why people
continue to build—and re-build—along the nation’s coasts. It directly
“provides residential coverage up to $250,000 for the structure and
$100,000 for contents, and up to $500,000 for business structures and
$500,000 for business contents.”49 These NFIP funds, moreover, become
part of a “highly subsidized” package of financial resources, and coastal
properties “are currently insured by a combination of [NFIP] policies, some
private excess coverage for flooding, and federal disaster relief that is
provided after specific events. This . . . encourages rebuilding in areas that
are already at high risk and which will eventually be inundated.”50
C.

The NFIP, Hurricanes, and Incentives

In a very real sense, the NFIP defies both the realities of coastal
dynamics and the logic of insurance schemes. Part of the issue is subsidized
premiums for properties located in areas likely to flood, which make the
program financially untenable in the long run—but homeowners remain
unwilling to pay the real cost of building along a coast, contributing to the
political dynamics of NFIP authorization. Indeed, the NFIP exists in large
part because “[p]rimary insurers—those that sell standard insurance policies
to individuals and businesses—. . . could not charge affordable premiums
and profit when private flood insurance was proposed in the 1950s.”51
However, the federal government has also not been able to make the
program pay for itself:

44. Repetitive Flood Claims Grant Program Fact Sheet, FEMA, https://www.fema.
gov/repetitive-flood-claims-grant-program-fact-sheet (last updated Mar. 2, 2018).
45. Spiegel, supra note 38.
46. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANALYSIS OF
FLORIDA’S NFIP REPETITIVE LOSS PROPERTIES: USING GEOSPATIAL TOOLS AND FIELD
VERIFICATION DATA 6 (2005), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-171225045-1952/analysis_of_florida_s_nfip_repetitive_loss_properties_using_geospatial_tools_
and_field_verrification_data.pdf.
47. U.C. Davis Center for Watershed Sciences, supra note 40.
48. Id.
49. Richards, supra note 13 at 446.
50. Id. at 428.
51. Michael Thrasher, The Private Flood Insurance Market Is Stirring After More Than
50 Years of Dormancy, FORBES (Aug. 26, 2016, 4:47 PM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/michaelthrasher/2016/08/26/the-private-flood-insurance-market-is-stirring-after-morethan-50-years-of-dormancy/#7889d6e96dda.
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The NFIP is designed to pay losses and operating expenses out of
policyholder premiums. However, the premiums that NFIP policyholders
have paid have historically been insufficient to cover the program’s
losses from flood claims. This is primarily because to achieve the NFIP’s
objectives, many NFIP policyholders have long received heavily
subsidized premium rates. . . . In 2013, roughly twenty percent of flood
insurance policies nationwide received discounts, typically worth fiftyfive to sixty percent off the full-risk price. FEMA’s 2011 Actuarial Rate
Review noted that, because of discounted premium rates, “it is currently
impractical for the NFIP to be actuarially sound in the aggregate.” 52

The Government Accountability Office (GAO), similarly, has noted
that “[a]s a result of the program’s importance, level of indebtedness to
Treasury, and substantial financial exposure for the federal government and
taxpayers, as well as FEMA’s operating and management challenges, NFIP
has been on our high-risk list since 2006.”53
More basically, the NFIP incentivizes building in the wrong places,
including along the coast. Indeed, one researcher noted that:
The NFIP is an actuarial joke. It would be like having a federal
automobile insurance company that only insured teenage boys who drink
and drive. By definition the properties covered by the program are
doomed to be flooded, damaged, and even destroyed, not just once, but
time and time again.54

FEMA itself has recognized that the NFIP exists because private
insurance schemes for the properties it insures cannot function profitably,
“primarily because of the catastrophic nature of flooding and the inability to
develop an actuarial rate structure which could adequately reflect the risk to
which flood-prone properties are exposed.”55 Thus, the NFIP has always
stepped in where private insurance companies feared to tread, creating
incentives to build in risky areas like coasts that the private market would
not support.56
Recent studies more concretely pinpoint the roles of coastal properties
and hurricanes in the NFIP’s insolvency. Increasing numbers of increasingly
damaging and expensive coastal storms in the 21st century have
52. Fox, supra note 22, at 217.
53. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 27, at 1.
54. Dwight H. Merriam, Regulating Rebuilding in Developed Areas Following
Disasters, in LOSING GROUND: A NATION ON EDGE 325, 326 (John R. Nolon & Daniel B.
Rodriguez eds., 2007).
55. 2002 FEMA NFIP OVERVIEW, supra note 20, at 1.
56. See UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 32, at 1 (“In the face of
increasingly unmanageable risks, many private insurers have left the coastal insurance
market. The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is now practically the sole provider of
flood insurance for home owners and small businesses nationwide.”).
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underscored the financial incoherence of the NFIP in a climate change era.
“Almost 50 years [after its creation], the NFIP is $25 billion in debt, partly
because of these subsidized rates that do not reflect the true cost of owning
coastal property.”57 Hurricanes and other severe coastal storms have strained
the NFIP far into insolvency, reflecting both an increasing frequency of
these storms and the growing physical and financial damage that they can
inflict. As for frequency, “[s]tarting in the 1990s . . . [e]ight of the most
damaging hurricanes in history came ashore in the next decade: Opal,
Danny, Georges, Frances, Lili, Ivan, Katrina, and Rita.”58 NFIP payouts
reflect this reality of increasing numbers of highly destructive storms: “In
2001, NFIP payouts topped a billion dollars. In 2005, they topped over
thirteen billion, and they broke the bank. Losses were over thirty billion
cumulatively through 2006.”59 However, the increasing amount of wealth
invested in coastal infrastructure has also helped to make more recent storms
costlier.60
The NFIP collects about $3.3 billion in premiums each year,61 but that
has not been enough in this century to cover its losses—primarily because of
coastal hurricanes. As the GAO noted in a report to Congress in August
2016, the 2005 hurricane season, especially hurricane Katrina, and
Superstorm Sandy in 2012 put FEMA in the position of having to borrow
money from the United States Department of the Treasury to pay NFIP
claims.62 The “NFIP paid out more claims in 2005 [following Hurricane
Katrina] than it had paid out over the entire life of the program to that
point.”63 Hurricane Katrina made Louisiana the second-largest recipient of
NFIP payments; without that event, Louisiana would rank number twelve. 64
“FEMA had insufficient funds to cover the claims, and Congress had to
increase NFIP’s borrowing authority to $20.775 billion. Following
Superstorm Sandy, that borrowing limit was increased again to $30
billion.”65 Superstorm Sandy had similarly distorting impacts on NFIP
payments and was single-handedly responsible for making New Jersey and
57. Shweitzer, supra note 36, at 250.
58. Houck, supra note 35, at 1078.
59. Id.
60. Fox, supra note 22, at 206–07. Prior to Tropical Storm Allison in 2001, NFIP had
never experienced a storm resulting in over $1 billion in damage. Since then, however,
Hurricane Katrina imposed a death toll estimated to range from just under 1,000 to nearly
2,000 and caused an estimated $148 billion in total damages and costs; Hurricane Irene in
2010 caused 45 deaths and $10.1 billion in total damages and costs; and Superstorm Sandy in
2012 resulted in 159 deaths and $65.7 billion in total damages and costs. Id.
61. Thrasher, supra note 51.
62. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 27, at 1.
63. Fox, supra note 22, at 218.
64. U.C. Davis Center for Watershed Sciences, supra note 40.
65. Fox, supra note 22, at 218.
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New York top ten NFIP payment recipients.66 These two storms thus
demonstrate the sensitivity of the NFIP to hurricanes and other major coastal
storm events, and, “[a]s of March 2016, FEMA owed Treasury $23
billion.”67
In anticipation of the 2017 reauthorization of the NFIP, the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) prepared a report on the program’s
fiscal soundness that underscores the distorting role that coastal properties
and hurricane exposure are playing.68 The CBO concluded overall that the
NFIP “had an expected one-year shortfall of $1.4 billion,”69 which “is
attributable largely to premiums falling short of expected costs in coastal
counties, which constitute roughly 10 percent of all counties with NFIP
policies but account for three-quarters of all NFIP policies nationwide.”70
Specifically, coastal counties had a net shortfall of $1.5 billion, while inland
counties had a net surplus of $200 million.71 The coastal counties’ shortfall,
moreover, arises because premiums “do not cover the expected cost of wave
damage from storm surges.”72
However, the CBO’s report became even more targeted. It estimated
“that the 33 counties with a shortfall of more than $10 million accounted for
nearly 90 percent of the $2 billion from all 823 counties with shortfalls”—
and most of those 33 counties were located “along the southeast coast and
the Gulf of Mexico.”73 In contrast, most of the counties with the highest
surpluses were located “along the northeast and west coasts,”74 creating a
map of donor and recipient counties that shows how much of the rest of the
nation subsidizes homeowners along the Gulf of Mexico and southeast
Atlantic coasts.75
66. U.C. Davis Center for Watershed Sciences, supra note 40 (eliminating the payments
from Superstorm Sandy, New Jersey would rank fifteenth and New York would rank
sixteenth).
67. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 27, at 1.
68. CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: FINANCIAL
SOUNDNESS AND AFFORDABILITY (2017), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files?file=115thcongress-2017-2018/reports/53028-nfipreport2.pdf.
69. Id. at 1.
70. Id. at 2; see also id. at 13 (“[Coastal counties]those with at least some expected
claims from storm surges or for which precipitation from coastal storms . . . accounted for
more than 75 percent of expected claims—represented only 10 percent of all counties with
NFIP policies. However, they accounted for most of the program’s total shortfall.”).
71. Id.; see also id. at 12 (“On net, coastal counties sow a large shortfall and inland
counties show a relatively small surplus.”).
72. CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 68.
73. Id. at 12.
74. Id. at 13.
75. Id. at 14 fig. 2. See also id. at 15 (“[T]he additional expected costs from wave
damage are spread broadly among the NFIP policyholders, resulting in a cross-subsidy from
inland counties (on average) to coastal counties. That is, some of the expected costs
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Coastal storm-related damages account for roughly two-thirds of NFIP
payouts over the last thirty-five years.76 Flooding from hurricane-related
storm surges accounts for 37% of the payouts; from hurricane-related
precipitation, 16%; from tropical storms, 5%; and from other kinds of
coastal storms, like nor’easters, 2%.77 In contrast, inland flooding causes
only 36% of NFIP payouts.78 Thus, the NFIP truly is becoming a coastal
hurricane insurance program.
The NFIP also promotes a counter-adaptive psychological world view
of coastal living. For example, property owners insured under the NFIP
appear to accept coastal damage and destruction as a normal event, not as a
signal to consider relocation. In southern California in January 2016,
“[m]assive waves cleared a 25-foot retaining wall and crashed into a
Pacifica restaurant . . . bursting through the beachside windows and rushing
over tables and chairs.”79 Although the restaurant has suffered the same kind
of damage in the past, the owner was counting on insurance to repair the
restaurant yet again, in time for an upcoming event.80 Likewise, coastal
flooding near Nantucket in February 2017 was described as a normal way of
life.81
III. THE 2017 HURRICANE SEASON, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NFIP
The NFIP came up for reauthorization in 2017, which happened to be
the worst year for hurricanes in the United States since 2005. This part
reviews the 2017 hurricane season, focusing on Hurricanes Harvey, Irma,
and Maria, before reflecting on what the season as a whole should mean for
the NFIP.

associated with coastal policies are covered by high premiums paid by policyholders in
inland counties.”); id. at 16 (“Eighty-five percent of the policyholders for properties located
in Zone V, the highest risk [and coastal] zone, do not pay rates that reflect their actual flood
risk.”).
76. CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 68, at 4.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Colleen Nowell & Michelle Roberts, Waves Burst into Pacifica’s Moonraker
Restaurant, Rushing Over Tables, Chairs, NBC BAY AREA (Jan. 24, 2017, 10:04 AM),
http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/Waves-Burst-Into-Pacifica-Restaurant-RushingOver-Tables-Chairs-411667915.html.
80. Id.
81. Caitlin Fichtel & Marc Fortier, Winter Storm Moves Out of Boston; Coastal
Flooding, Power Outages Possible, NBC BOS. (Feb. 12, 2017, 1:41 PM), http://www.nbc
boston.com/news/local/Preparations-Underway-for-Another-Storm-413530223.html.
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Hurricane Harvey: A Climate Change Connection to Record Rain

Hurricane Harvey was a Category 4 hurricane that made landfall on the
central Texas coast just north of Corpus Christi on August 25, 2017.82 At its
first landfall, it was 280 miles in diameter and had 130 mile-per-hour
winds.83 It moved north to Houston the next day and remained there for four
days, then made landfall a third time on August 29 at Port Arthur and
Beaumont, Texas, near the Louisiana border.84 While Hurricane Harvey
concentrated its force on Texas and Louisiana, “[i]t affected 13 million
people from Texas through Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, and
Kentucky,” and at least 88 people died as a result of the storm.85
Storm surge from Hurricane Harvey ranged from 3 feet to 12.5 feet,
with the highest storm surge occurring in Aransas County in a National
Wildlife Refuge, limiting the amount of human damage.86 However, most of
Hurricane Harvey’s damage came from flooding caused by unprecedented
rainfall.87 As noted, the hurricane stalled over Houston, dropping 2 feet of
rain in the first 24 hours and 40 inches over 48 hours.88 Two reservoirs
overflowed.89 When the hurricane made landfall for the third time, “[i]t
dumped 26 inches of rain in 24 hours” at the Louisiana border,90 then rained
an additional 10 inches in Nashville, Tennessee, on September 1st.91
In an attempt to describe the scale of the rainfall, a reporter noted that
“[a]t least 20 inches of rain fell over an area (nearly 29,000 square miles)
larger than 10 states, including West Virginia and Maryland (by a factor of
more than two)” and “[a]t least 30 inches of rain fell over an area (more than
11,000 square miles) equivalent to Maryland’s size.”92 At the storm’s peak
on September 1, one-third of Houston was underwater,93 and “[t]otal rainfall

82. Kimberly Amadeo, Hurricane Harvey Facts, Damage, and Costs, BALANCE (Sept.
18, 2018), https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-harvey-facts-damage-costs-4150087.
83. Hurricane Harvey Aftermath: What Happened and What’s Next, CNN https://
www.cnn.com/specials/us/hurricane-harvey (last visited Feb. 19, 2018).
84. Amadeo, supra note 82.
85. Id.
86. Id.; Jason Samenow, Harvey Is a 1000-Year Flood Event Unprecedented in Scale,
WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/capital-weathergang/wp/2017/08/31/harvey-is-a-1000-year-flood-event-unprecedented-in-scale/?utm_term=
.a36393ce6b2f.
87. Amadeo, supra note 82.
88. Id. (“In comparison Hurricane Katrina dropped just 5 to 10 inches of rain in 48
hours. Most of its flooding came from storm surges that overwhelmed the levee system.”).
89. Id.
90. Id.; Hurricane Harvey Aftermath: What Happened and What’s Next, supra note 83.
91. Amadeo, supra note 82.
92. Samenow, supra note 86.
93. Amadeo, supra note 82.
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hit 51.88 inches in Cedar Bayou on the outskirts of Houston. That’s a record
for a single storm in the continental United States.”94
In addition, “Harvey flooded 800 wastewater treatment facilities and 13
Superfund sites. That spread sewage and toxic chemicals into the flooded
areas.”95 On August 31, an Arkema chemical plant in Crosby, Texas, ignited
after the hurricane disrupted the cooling system necessary to keep the
chemicals stable.96
As of September 5, 2017, Hurricane Harvey had damaged 203,000
homes, of which 12,700 were destroyed.97 At $125 billion in damages, the
storm ranks second only to Hurricane Katrina (adjusted to 2017 dollars) as
the most damaging storm in United States history, according to National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) National Hurricane
Center.98
Hurricane Harvey caused a “thousand-year flood,”99 reaching many
victims that were outside of the NFIP’s Special Flood Hazard Areas—a
significant reason that only about one-fifth of Hurricane Harvey’s Texas
victims had flood insurance,100 despite the fact that there are more than
584,000 active NFIP policies in Texas, the second most heavily NFIPinsured state in the nation after Florida.101 Even so, as of early November
2017, FEMA had paid out over $4 billion to NFIP policyholders damaged
by Hurricane Harvey.102 By February 2018, Harvey had generated 91,226
flood insurance claims, and FEMA had paid out more than $8.5 billion

94. Id.; Hurricane Harvey Aftermath: What Happened and What’s Next, supra note 83.
95. Amadeo, supra note 82.
96. Id.
97. David Wharton, Hurricane Harvey’s Effect on Flood Insurance Coverage, DS NEWS
(Aug. 1, 2018, 7:08 PM), https://dsnews.com/daily-dose/08-01-2018/hurricane-harveysflood-insurance.
98. Costliest U.S. Tropical Cyclones Tables Updated 1, 2 tbl. 3a, & 3 tbl. 3b, U.S.
NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (2018), https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/news/
UpdatedCostliest.pdf.
99. Amadeo, supra note 82; Ari Blask & Ike Brannon, Hurricane Harvey Proved We
Need More Flood Insurance Competition, TIME (Sept. 5, 2017), http://time.com/
4927852/hurricane-harvey-flood-insurance/; Samenow, supra note 86.
100. Blask & Brannon, supra note 99. In Louisiana and Texas combined, approximately
70% of the homes damaged by Harvey were not covered by flood insurance. Matt Simon,
Flood Insurance and the Historic 2017 Hurricane Season, HILL & HAMILTON: OHIO INS.
BLOG (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.hillandhamilton.com/ohio-insurance-blog/floodinsurance-and-the-historic-2017-hurricane-season.
101. Abby Livingston, After Hurricanes, Congress Ponders Future of Flood Insurance
Program, TEX. TRIB. (Oct. 9, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/10
/09/flood-insurance/.
102. FEMA Will Recover $1.042 Billion in Reinsurance from the Private Reinsurance
Markets, FEMA (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.fema.gov/news-release/2017/12/05/fema-willrecover-1042-billion-reinsurance-private-reinsurance-markets.
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under the NFIP.103 Notably, however, low-income and minority
communities in Houston continue to suffer,104 underscoring some of the
environmental justice concerns encompassed within national flood insurance
and disaster relief policies in addition to the financial and climate change
adaptation issues.
Harvey may be the first hurricane for which scientists agree that
climate change played a surprisingly large role in the storm’s severity.105 In
December 2017, two research groups found that Harvey’s record rainfall
“was as much as 38 percent higher than would be expected in a world that
was not warming.”106 Warmer-than-normal air temperatures, sea levels that
are six inches higher than 20 years ago, and climate change-affected weather
patterns that promote storm stalling may all have contributed to Harvey’s
excessive precipitation.107 In addition, both studies “found that climate
change roughly tripled the odds of a Harvey-type storm.”108
Thus, as climate scientists have predicted, it appears that climate
change is already increasing the likelihood of increasingly severe
hurricanes. This fact should be informing the NFIP reauthorization.
B.

Hurricane Irma: A Historic Storm

In some ways, Hurricane Irma surpassed Hurricane Harvey. “Irma was
the strongest storm on record in the Atlantic—excluding the Caribbean and
103. FED. EMERGENCY MNGT. AGENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., Hurricane
Harvey 6 Months Later (2018), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1519758737023e405f4a9920205df46319668b002e878/6MonthTexasHarveyRecoveryGuide.pdf.
104. Danny Vinik, ‘People Just Give Up’: Low-Income Hurricane Victims Slam Federal
Relief Programs, POLITICO (May 29, 2018, 5:08 AM), https://www.politico.com/story
/2018/05/29/houston-hurricane-harvey-fema-597912.
105. Amadeo, supra note 82; Henry Fountain, Scientists Link Hurricane Harvey’s Record
Rainfall to Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com
/2017/12/13/climate/hurricane-harvey-climate-change.html?_r=0; see also Geert Jan van
Oldenborgh et al., Attribution of Extreme Rainfall from Hurricane Harvey, August 2017, 12
ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 10 (2017); Mark D. Risser & Michael F. Wehner, Attributable
Human-Induced Changes in the Likelihood and Magnitude of the Observed Extreme
Precipitation During Hurricane Harvey, 44 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 12,457, 12,463
(2017).
106. Fountain, supra note 105; see Michael Greshko, Climate Change Likely
Supercharged Hurricane Harvey, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Dec. 13, 2017), https://news.national
geographic.com/2017/12/climate-change-study-hurricane-harvey-flood/ (reporting the same
38% high); see also Oldenborgh et al., supra note 105, at 1 (reporting 15% as most probable);
Risser & Wehner, supra note 105, at 12,46263 (reporting 19% as most probable).
107. Amadeo, supra note 82; German Lopez, How Global Warming Likely Made Harvey
Much Worse, Explained by a Climatologist, VOX (Aug. 28, 2017, 10:30 AM), https://
www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/8/28/16214268/houston-floods-harvey-globalwarming.
108. Greshko, supra note 106; see Oldenborgh et al., supra note 105, at 1.
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Gulf of Mexico—with maximum winds of 185 mph and an unofficial wind
gust of 199 mph.”109 It remained a hurricane from August 31 until
September 11, 2017.110 The storm stretched 650 miles from east to west and
affected nine states in the United States, as well as devastating the
Caribbean.111 At its peak, Irma’s cloud field covered 300,000 square
miles.112 It also was “the first storm on record to maintain winds as strong as
185 mph for 37 hours.”113
In the Caribbean, Hurricane Irma was sheer power. According to one
reporter, “its coastal storm surges were 20 feet above normal tide levels,”
and the hurricane “held 7 trillion watts of energy. That’s twice as much as
all bombs used in World War II. Its force was so powerful that earthquake
seismometers recorded it. It generated the most accumulated cyclone energy
in a 24-hour period.”114
Irma made landfall eight times.115 Along the way, it knocked out power
in Puerto Rico (September 7) and dumped 15 inches of rain on Haiti and the
Dominican Republic (September 7).116 In Barbuda, Hurricane Irma damaged
90% of the buildings, “destroyed almost all communication, and left 60
percent of the population homeless.”117 In the hurricane’s wake, Barbuda
was entirely evacuated, and few people have returned.118 In the British
Virgin Islands, “Hurricane Irma made two direct landfalls . . . both at peak
109. Doyle Rice, 2017’s Three Monster Hurricanes—Harvey, Irma, and Maria—Among
Five Costliest Ever, USA TODAY (Jan. 30, 2018, 2:54 PM), https://www.usatoday
.com/story/weather/2018/01/30/2017-s-three-monster-hurricanes-harvey-irma-and-mariaamong-five-costliest-ever/1078930001/; see Jonathan Belles, 2017 Atlantic Hurricane
Season Recap: 17 Moments We’ll Never Forget, WEATHER CHANNEL (Nov. 28, 2017, 9:45
AM),
https://weather.com/storms/hurricane/news/2017-11-11-moments-hurricane-seasonatlantic-irma-maria-harvey (“Irma’s peak intensity based on wind speed was the second
highest in Atlantic basin history only behind Hurricane Allen in 1980, which had winds of
190 mph.”); Irma: A Hurricane for the History Books, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/
specials/hurricane-irma (last visited Feb. 19, 2018) (“Hurricane Irma is the strongest Atlantic
basin hurricane ever recorded outside the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea.”).
110. Irma: A Hurricane for the History Books, supra note 109.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.; see Amadeo, supra note 82 (“It beat Super Typhoon Haiyan, which maintained
winds at that level for 24 hours in 2013.”).
114. Amadeo, supra note 82.
115. The eight landfalls were: Barbuda on September 6 (Category 5, 185 mph); St. Martin
(Category 5, 185 mph); British Virgin Islands (two landfalls, Category 5, 185 mph); Little
Inagua, Bahamas (Category 5, 160 mph); northern Cuba on September 9, flooding Havana
(Category 3-4, 125-160 mph); Florida Keys on September 10 (Category 4, 130 mph); and
finally, in southwest Florida (Category 3, 115 mph). Compiled from Amadeo, supra note 82;
Belles, supra note 109; Irma: A Hurricane for the History Books, supra note 109.
116. Amadeo, supra note 82.
117. Id.
118. Belles, supra note 109.
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intensity; one on Tortola and another on Ginger Island. Damage in the
[British Virgin Islands] was extensive, and on some islands, it was
catastrophic. Many buildings and roads were left in ruins.”119 The hurricane
then traveled to the U.S. Virgin Islands, decimating St. John,120 before
traveling the entire length of Florida from south to north.121 The Florida
Keys endured 12 inches of rain and a storm surge of 10 feet.122 “The most
rain in the state fell on Fort Pierce. It received 15.9 inches. The strongest
winds (142 mph) hit Naples.”123 At least 102 people died from the storm, 75
in Florida alone.124
According to the National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Irma was the
fifth costliest tropical storm in the United States, causing $50 billion in
damage.125 Within the United States, Hurricane Irma’s primary victims were
in Florida. When Irma made landfall in Florida, the state contained 1.7
million NFIP policyholders, representing 35% of NFIP participants
nationwide.126 Moreover, 15,000 Florida homes are NFIP repetitive-loss
properties.127 NFIP policyholders damaged by Hurricane Irma had received
$179 million in payouts as of early November 2017.128 By March 2018,
FEMA had paid out $860 million under the NFIP program.129
C.

Hurricane Maria: The Devastation of Puerto Rico

After forming as a tropical storm on September 16, 2017, Maria rapidly
intensified into a Category 5 hurricane. It first made landfall on September

119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Lisa J. Huriash, Florida Death Toll from Hurricane Irma Keeps Rising, SUN
SENTINEL (Nov. 22, 2017, 9:00 PM), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/weather/hurricane
/fl-reg-hurricane-irma-deaths-20171120-story.html.
122. Amadeo, supra note 82.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Costliest U.S. Tropical Cyclones Tables Updated, supra note 98, at 1, 2 tbl. 3a (Jan.
26, 2018), https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/news/UpdatedCostliest.pdf.
126. Justin Worland, A Devastating Hurricane Season Exposes America’s Flood
Insurance Problem, YAHOO! (Sept. 9, 2017), https://www.yahoo.com/news/devastatinghurricane-season-exposes-america-143733243.html.
127. Id.
128. Bob Fredericks, Why FEMA Has Paid Puerto Rico Just $121K in Wake of
Hurricane Maria, N.Y. POST (Nov. 3, 2017, 10:40 PM), https://nypost.com/2017/11/03/whyfema-has-paid-puerto-rico-just-121k-in-wake-of-hurricane-maria/.
129. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & FLA. STATE ENF’T
RESPONSE TEAM, HURRICANE RECOVERY MOVES FORWARD: SIX MONTHS AFTER HURRICANE
IRMA IN FLORIDA 1 (2018), https://www.fpnetwork.org/sites/default/files/resources/Irma%
20in%20Florida%206%20month%20recap%20March%207.pdf.
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18 on Dominica, devastating the island.130 Maria also battered the U.S.
Virgin Islands for a second time, and about 80% of those islands remained
without power for more than a month.131
What Hurricane Maria is infamous for, however, is its destruction of
the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico. On September 20, Maria made landfall on
Puerto Rico as a Category 4 hurricane,132 “the strongest storm to hit Puerto
Rico in 85 years.”133 It eliminated electricity to almost all of the island and
heavily damaged the power grid.134 It also cut off water delivery, disrupted
cell phone service,135 and destroyed Puerto Rico’s radar.136 On September
22, “[t]he National Weather Service order[ed] the evacuation of about
70,000 people living near the Guajataca River in northwest Puerto Rico
because a dam [wa]s in danger of failing.”137
The death toll in Puerto Rico from Hurricane Maria has become its
own political controversy. According to original official tallies, 64 people
died because of the storm, but in January 2018 some news agencies put the
number closer to 1,000,138 and by late May 2018 the calculated estimate had
risen to 4,645 deaths, “many of them from delayed medical care.”139 In late
August 2018, the Puerto Rico government settled on 2,975 fatalities as its
official death toll.140 However, controversy erupted again in September 2018
130. 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season Fast Facts, CNN (Dec. 15, 2017),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/05/15/us/2017-atlantic-hurricane-season-fast-facts/index.html.
131. Belles, supra note 109.
132. Umair Irfan, One of the Clearest Signs of Climate Change in Hurricanes Maria,
Irma, and Harvey Was the Rain, VOX (Sept. 29, 2017, 9:46 AM), https://www.vox
.com/energy-and-environment/2017/9/28/16362522/hurricane-maria-2017-irma-harvey-rainflooding-climate-change.
133. 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season Fast Facts, supra note 130.
134. Id.
135. Belles, supra note 109.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Norbert Figueroa, How Hurricane Maria Forced Puerto Ricans to Change Their
Hair, GUARDIAN (Jan. 24, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/
jan/24/puerto-rico-hurricane-maria-hairstyles.
139. Sheri Fink, Puerto Rico’s Hurricane Maria Death Toll Could Exceed 4,000, New
Study Estimates, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/29
/us/puerto-rico-deaths-hurricane.html. It is worth noting that while the Harvard study that
generated this estimate has been subject to critique, almost all counts put the death toll
significantly higher than the original official count of sixty-four. See Glenn Kessler, Did 4645
People Die in Hurricane Maria? Nope., WASH. POST (June 1, 2018) https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2018/06/02/did-4645-people-die-in-hurricanemaria-nope/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.933269211614.
140. Nicole Darrah, Puerto Rico Governor Raises Hurricane Maria Death Toll from 64
to 2,975, FOX NEWS (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.foxnews.com/us/puerto-rico-governorraises-hurricane-maria-death-toll-from-64-to-2975; Leyla Santiago, Catherine E. Shoichet &
Jason Kravarik, Puerto Rico’s New Hurricane Maria Death Toll Is 46 Times Higher Than the
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when President Donald Trump denied by tweet that nearly 3,000 people had
died, claiming that the real number was more like 20 deaths and that the
“inflated” number was a Democratic plot to make him look bad.141
Whatever the exact death toll from Hurricane Maria might have been in
Puerto Rico, the U.S. government did receive serious criticism for not
adequately responding to Puerto Rico’s devastation.142 Hurricane Maria
“destroyed thousands of homes, killed at least 64 people and left thousands
without electricity or water for months.”143 A month after the hurricane,
about 35% of Puerto Rico’s 3.4 million residents still lacked access to clean
water, and FEMA’s emergency provisions appeared to many to fall far short
of basic human needs.144 As of late January 2018, “about 60,000 homes
[were] still without roofs, 2.3 million people live[d] in areas at risk of water
contamination, and 15.5% of the population still lack[ed] electricity.”145 By
mid-February 2018, “99% of customers in Puerto Rico had running water,
and 84% of the island had power back,” but “[m]ore than 400,000 customers
still [did not] have electricity.”146 Despite a FEMA error that sparked fears
that aid to the island was ending, that aid continues.147 By June 2018, most
of the island had its electricity restored, at least intermittently, but hundreds
of schools threatened to close for the 2018-2019 academic year.148
Government’s Previous Count, CNN (Aug. 28, 2018, 6:25 PM), https://www.cnn.com/
2018/08/28/health/puerto-rico-gw-report-excess-deaths/index.html.
141. William Cummings, Outpourings of Outrage Fill Twitter After Trump Denies
Hurricane Maria’s 3,000 Death Toll, USA TODAY (Sept. 13, 2018, 1:03 PM), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2018/09/13/trump-denial-hurricane-mariadeath-toll-puerto-rico-fuels-fury/1288530002/ (republishing President Trump’s tweets, as
well).
142. E.g., Robinson Meyer, What’s Happening with the Relief Effort in Puerto Rico?,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 4, 2017) https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/10/whathappened-in-puerto-rico-a-timeline-of-hurricane-maria/541956/.
143. Rick Jervis, ‘Five Months Without Power’: Blackout Is Latest Snag in Puerto Rico’s
Long Recovery from Hurricane Maria, USA TODAY (Feb. 13, 2018, 11:08 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/02/12/power-outage-puerto-rico-latest-snagislands-long-recovery-hurricane-maria/329322002/.
144. John D. Sutter, About 1 Million Americans Without Running Water. 3 Million
Without Power. This Is Life One Month After Hurricane Maria, CNN, (Oct. 20, 2017, 3:11
PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/18/health/puerto-rico-one-month-without-water/index.
html.
145. Figueroa, supra note 138.
146. Jervis, supra note 143.
147. Patricia Mazzei, A FEMA Error Drove Fears That Food and Water Aid to Puerto
Rico Was Ending. It’s Not., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 2018/01/
31/us/puerto-rico-fema-aid.html.
148. Gabe Gutierrez & Bianca Seward, Puerto Rico 9 month after Hurricane Maria:
Questions Persist over Death Toll, Closed Schools, NBC NEWS (June 17, 2018, 6:08 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/puerto-rico-crisis/puerto-rico-9-months-after-hurricanemaria-questions-persist-over-n883921.
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Hurricane Maria clearly tested Puerto Rico’s resources. “From a
meteorological standpoint, Maria was nearly a worst-case scenario for the
territory: The center of a huge, nearly Category 5 hurricane made a direct hit
on Puerto Rico, lashing the island with wind and rain for longer than 30
hours.”149 However, the NFIP played little role in Puerto Rico’s recovery.
The NFIP applies in Puerto Rico through MAPFRE, which sells flood
insurance policies for island properties pursuant to a contract with FEMA.150
Moreover, on November 1, 2017, FEMA made it easier for policyholders
damaged by Maria to make claims, including a $20,000 advance.151
However, most homeowners on the island lacked even basic wind damage
insurance,152 let alone a NFIP policy for flooding—there were only 5,675
NFIP policies in force on Puerto Rico, an island with 1.57 million housing
units.153 As a result, Puerto Rican homeowners have been paid only
$121,000 under the program.154 Instead of experiencing recovery through
insurance, Puerto Rico has relied far more extensively on federal disaster
relief, resurrecting the federal role in dealing with flooding that Congress
intended the NFIP to replace.155
Nevertheless, even though Hurricane Maria is not contributing much to
the NFIP’s debt, it now ranks as the third costliest hurricane in U.S. history.
It caused $90 billion in damages, less than Hurricanes Katrina and Harvey
but more than Hurricane Sandy.156
D.

What Should the 2017 Hurricane Season Mean for the NFIP?

Together, Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria made 2017 the costliest
hurricane season in U.S. history, surpassing the previous record set in 2005,
149. Meyer, supra note 142.
150. Flood Insurance, MAPFRE, https://www.mapfre.pr/insurance-pr/personal-insurance
/property-contingency/flood/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2018).
151. FEMA’s National Flood Insurance Program Enhances the Flood Claims Process
and Extends Grace Period for Policy Renewals, FEMA (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.fema.
gov/news-release/2017/11/01/4339/femas-national-flood-insurance-program-enhances-floodclaims-process-and.
152. Leslie Scism & Nicole Friedman, Hurricane Maria Exposes a Common Problem for
Puerto Rican Homeowners: No Insurance, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 20, 2017, 4:51 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/hurricane-maria-exposes-a-common-problem-for-puerto-ricohomeowners-no-insurance-1505940660.
153. Tim Johnson & Kevin G. Hall, Few Puerto Rican Households Had Flood Insurance.
They Can’t Afford It, MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 12, 2017, 11:02 AM), http://www.miamiherald
.com/latest-news/article178346336.html.
154. Fredericks, supra note 128.
155. See, e.g., Six Months After Maria: Progress Made, Work Continues, FEMA (Mar.
16, 2018), https://www.fema.gov/news-release/2018/03/16/six-months-after-maria-progressmade-work-continues (describing federal relief efforts).
156. Costliest U.S. Tropical Cyclones Tables Updated, supra note 98, at 1, 2 tbl. 3a.
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the year of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma.157 The season had some
other notable features, as well. First, in 2017, “[s]eventeen named storms, 10
hurricanes, and 6 major (Category 3 or stronger) hurricanes tore through the
Atlantic Basin, well above the 30-year average of 12 storms, 6 hurricanes
and 2 major hurricanes. This placed 2017 among the top 10 most active
Atlantic seasons on record . . . .”158
Second, Tropical Storm Arlene, the first of the season, formed on April
20, 2017, “more than a month before the beginning of hurricane season
[and] the second earliest-forming tropical cyclone in the Atlantic in the
satellite era (or since 1966).”159 Third, Hurricane Maria, like Hurricane Irma,
reached Category 5 strength, making 2017 only the second hurricane season
in which two Category 5 storms made landfall.160 Fourth, two Category 4
hurricanes made landfall on the continental United States in 2017, the first
time that has happened since hurricane records were started in 1851.161 Fifth,
Irma, Jose and Katia were all active in the Atlantic Ocean at the same time,
the first time since 2010 that three hurricanes existed simultaneously. 162
Sixth, in October 2017, Ophelia became the tenth consecutively named
storm to achieve hurricane status, the fourth recorded time—and first time

157. Rice, supra note 109; see also Willie Drye, 2017 Hurricane Season Was the Most
Expensive in U.S. History, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Nov. 30, 2017), https://news.
nationalgeographic.com/2017/11/2017-hurricane-season-most-expensive-us-history-spd/
(“U.S. suffered more than $200 billion worth of damage from 17 named storms during the
season. . . . That easily eclipses the previous record of about $159 billion, set during the
summer of 2005, when Hurricane Katrina inflicted massive devastation on New Orleans. A
record 28 named storms formed that year.”).
158. Belles, supra note 109; see also Extremely Active 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season
Finally Ends, NOAA (Nov. 30, 2017), http://www.noaa.gov/media-release/extremely-active2017-atlantic-hurricane-season-finally-ends (“The season produced 17 named storms of
which 10 became hurricanes including six major hurricanes (Category 3, 4 or 5)–including
the first two major hurricanes to hit the continental U.S. in 12 years.”). Besides Hurricanes
Harvey, Irma, and Maria, the named storms included Arlene (tropical storm, central Atlantic),
Bret (tropical storm, near Trinidad), Cindy (tropical storm, landfall in Texas/Louisiana), Don
(tropical storm, east-southeast of Barbados), Emily (tropical storm, landfall in Florida),
Franklin (Category 1 hurricane, landfall in Mexico), Gert (Category 1 hurricane, stayed in the
Atlantic Ocean), Jose (Category 4 hurricane, east-southeast of Leeward Islands), Katia
(Category 1 hurricane, landfall in Mexico), Lee (Category 3 hurricane, west-southwest of
Cabo Verde islands), Nate (Category 1 hurricane, landfall in Mississippi/Louisiana), Ophelia
(Category 3 hurricane, northeast Atlantic, landfall as a tropical storm in Ireland), Philippe
(tropical storm, landfall in Florida), and Rina (tropical storm, east of Bermuda). Compiled
from 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season Fast Facts, supra note 130; Extremely Active 2017
Atlantic Hurricane Season Finally Ends, supra note 158; Belles, supra note 109.
159. Belles, supra note 109.
160. Rice, supra note 109.
161. Id.; see also Amadeo, supra note 82 (“Irma’s attack was the first time in 100 years
that two storms Category 4 or larger hit the U.S. mainland in the same year.”).
162. Irma: A Hurricane for the History Books, supra note 109.
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since 1893—that ten consecutive hurricanes have occurred in one season.163
Notably, Ophelia also traveled to Wales, Scotland, and Ireland.164 Finally,
“September 2017, featuring Category 5 Hurricanes Irma and Maria and
Category 4 Hurricane Jose, was the most active month of any Atlantic
hurricane season on record in terms of Accumulated Cyclone Energy
(ACE).”165 The September 2017 storms also included Irma, Jose, Katia, Lee
and Maria.166
As the studies linking climate change to Hurricane Harvey’s severe
rainfall suggest, evidence indicates that climate change is making Atlantic
hurricanes likelier, stronger, and more frequent. In 2008, researchers noted
that Atlantic hurricanes had been getting stronger on average over the last
thirty years.167 Notably, “Hurricane Patricia, in 2015, set the record at the
time for top wind speed—215 miles per hour—in the north Atlantic. The
next year Winston shattered records as the most intense cyclone in the
Southern Hemisphere.”168 Climate models also predict more Category 4 and
5 storms,169 and warming ocean waters will continue to fuel hurricanes as
they did in 2017, when “[u]nusually warm water in the area where
hurricanes form in the Atlantic Ocean fueled the powerful storms, which
formed when the peak of the season arrived in late August.”170 Overall,
scientists conclude that storm events like Hurricane Harvey will become
more common.171 Some commentators even call the 2017 hurricane season a
harbinger of what climate change means for the coasts.172
Climate change and its effects on coastal storms thus pose a real
problem for the NFIP when it comes to coastal properties, because current
insurance is not structured to reflect the need for climate change adaptation.
As Edward Richards has summarized, “The role of insurance in driving
163. Belles, supra note 109.
164. Id.
165. Id. According to NOAA:
Based on the Accumulated Cyclone Energy index, which measures the combined
intensity and duration of the storms during the season and is used to classify the
strength of the entire hurricane season, 2017 was the seventh most active season
in the historical record dating to 1851 and was the most active season since 2005.
Extremely Active 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season Finally Ends, supra note 158.
166. Belles, supra note 109.
167. James B. Elsner, James P. Kossin & Thomas H. Jagger, The Increasing Intensity of
the Strongest Tropical Cyclones, 445 NATURE 92, 92 (2008).
168. Annie Sneed, Was the Extreme 2017 Hurricane Season Driven by Climate Change?,
SCI. AM. (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/was-the-extreme-2017hurricane-season-driven-by-climate-change/.
169. Id.
170. Drye, supra note 157.
171. Kerry Emanuel, Assessing the Present and Future Probability of Hurricane
Harvey’s Rainfall, 114 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI., 12,681, 12,68184 (2017).
172. Drye, supra note 157.
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adaptation is limited because most insured risks are short-term weather risks
that are not tightly linked to climate change during the time period of the
typical insurance policy.”173
The 2017 hurricane season certainly had an effect on the NFIP’s fiscal
stability. In the wake of that season, the NFIP reached its approximately $30
billion borrowing limit, prompting Congress in October 2017 to forgive $16
billion of the program’s debt.174 However, continuing claims from the
storms led the program to borrow another $6.1 billion in early November
2017, bringing its debt back up to more than $20.5 billion.175 As of early
December 2017, Harvey, Irma, and Maria had generated more than 120,000
NFIP policy claims, for which FEMA had paid $6.687 billion.176 FEMA
expects payouts for the three hurricanes to total between $8.5 and $9.5
billion.177 Moreover, costs of the NFIP program are only expected to
increase over time. For example, “[i]n 2016, the non-partisan CBO
estimated that damage from hurricanes costs roughly $28 billion per year.
Over the next 60 years, those costs are expected to rise at least 40%, after
adjusting for inflation.”178
Despite these fiscal impacts, however, the NFIP has not been updated
for climate change; instead, the program assesses risk—and calculates
premiums—based on historical flood data.179 As Hurricane Harvey so aptly
demonstrated in 2017, historical data no longer accurately reflects the
geographical extent or future likelihood of potential flood damage from
hurricanes. As a result, without substantial reforms, the NFIP’s coverage of
coastal properties is likely to diverge from reality even more than the CBO
projected in 2016.
Indeed, the CBO itself, in preparing advice to Congress in September
2017, was well aware that climate change could complicate coastal flooding
and the NFIP’s solvency. As one source of uncertainty, for example, it noted
“scientists are seeking to better understand how climate change might affect
sea surface temperatures and wind shear and how these changes, in turn,
could affect the frequency and intensity of hurricanes.”180 In addition, it
173. Richards, supra note 13, at 428.
174. Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Requirements Act,
2017, Pub. L. No. 115-72, § 308, 131 Stat. 1224; see also Zachary Warmbrodt, House Passes
Flood Insurance Renewal in Wake of Massive Storms, POLITICO (Nov. 14, 2017, 7:38 PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/11/14/house-passes-flood-insurance-reauthorization244908 (discussing this history).
175. Warmbrodt, supra note 174.
176. FEMA Will Recover $1.042 Billion in Reinsurance from the Private Reinsurance
Markets, supra note 102.
177. Id.
178. Worland, supra note 126.
179. Blask & Brannon, supra note 99; Warmbrodt, supra note 174.
180. CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 68, at 10.
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noted that, “in the coming decades, coastal development and the effects of
climate change are expected to increase property damage from coastal
flooding. Climate change could increase damage by raising sea levels and
potentially also by increasing the intensity of hurricanes.”181 Nevertheless, it
remains to be seen whether Congress will incorporate climate change and its
effects on coastal storms into account in reauthorizing the NFIP, the subject
to which this article now turns.
IV. THE 2017-2018 NFIP REAUTHORIZATION PROCESS: IS CONGRESS
THINKING ABOUT HURRICANES AND CLIMATE CHANGE?
As the discussions above make clear, the impacts of climate change
and coastal storms on coastal properties create real financial problems for
the NFIP. The reauthorization process in 2017 and 2018 thus provided an
opportunity for Congress to use the NFIP as a means both to educate the
American public about the real risks of living along the Gulf of Mexico and
southeastern coast and to reform the law to dis-incentivize continued coastal
development. At the same time, if Congress chooses to amend the NFIP to
reward state, local, and homeowner efforts to mitigate storm damage, the
program could effectively encourage active climate change adaptation along
coasts. As the Union of Concerned Scientists has recommended,
“[r]eforming our insurance system to reflect this growing exposure can help
communicate the true risks to coastal communities so they are motivated to
take protective steps.”182
The question, of course, is whether Congress will make the most of this
opportunity. This part reviews the 2017-2018 NFIP reauthorization process
for signs that hurricanes and climate change matter.
A.

Hurricanes and the Last NFIP Reauthorization

Hurricanes have prompted congressional reforms of the NFIP in the
past, although those reforms were short lived. In 2012, the year of
“Superstorm” Sandy, Congress enacted the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance
Reform Act (“Biggert-Waters”)183 “to eliminate the NFIP’s debt by
increasing flood insurance rates to reflect the true cost of owning coastal
property.”184 This Act introduced the concepts of the 100-year and 500-year
floodplain,185 and it provided for a national flood mapping program.186 It
181. Id. at 17.
182. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 32, at 2.
183. Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126 Stat. 916 (2012) (amending scattered sections of the
National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4131).
184. Shweitzer, supra note 36, at 250.
185. Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 100202(a)(1) & (2).
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tried to eliminate subsidized flood insurance for certain properties, including
repetitive-loss properties,187 and it raised the rate at which premiums could
be increased.188 In addition, the Act required that premiums reflect the real
flood risk that properties face:
[A]ny property located in an area that is participating in the national
flood insurance program shall have the risk premium rate charged for
flood insurance on such property adjusted to accurately reflect the
current risk of flood to such property, subject to any other provision of
this Act. Any increase in the risk premium rate charged for flood
insurance on any property that is covered by a flood insurance policy on
the effective date of such an update that is a result of such updating shall
be phased in over a 5–year period, at the rate of 20 percent for each year
following such effective date.189

The Act also intended to phase out grandfathering, “a practice that
enables property owners to keep their old premium prices when a new
FEMA flood map reclassifies them into a higher-risk flood zone.”190
Biggert-Waters “represented a bipartisan effort to improve actuarial
soundness and program solvency.”191 Less publicized is Biggert-Waters’s
acknowledgement that coastal flooding was an increasingly important threat
to the nation. In addition to amending the NFIA, Biggert-Waters amended
the Integrated Coastal and Ocean Observation System Act of 2009192 to
require the development of a Named Storm Event Model. The model must
be at least 90% accurate and be able to identify named tropical storms and
hurricanes that pose a threat to coastal states and generate post-storm
assessments.193 This model would then be used to help calculate loss
allocations between wind and water for indeterminate losses—generally,
properties completely destroyed by a storm—along the coast.194
Biggert-Waters represents one swing of the congressional pendulum
regarding the NFIP, toward fiscal solvency. However, fiscal solvency
measures can run counter to political will and the desires of coastal property
owners to avoid facing the true costs of the risks they are incurring. Indeed,
186. Id. § 100216.
187. Id. § 100205(a).
188. Id. § 100205(c).
189. Id. § 100207.
190. Shweitzer, supra note 36, at 251.
191. Tarlock & Chizewer, supra note 29, at 521.
192. Pub. L. No. 111-11, tit. 12, § 12301, 123 Stat. 1427 (2009), (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§
3601–3611), amended by Pub. L. No. 112-141 § 100252.
193. Pub. L. No. 112-141 § 100252 (amending 33. U.S.C. § 3611).
194. Id. § 100253; see also COSTAL Act: Overview, NAT’L WEATHER SERV.,
https://www.weather.gov/sti/coastalact (last visited Feb. 23, 2018) (explaining how the
Named Storm Event Model influences FEMA’s indeterminate loss calculations).
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coastal property owners responded to Biggert-Waters’s enactment with
panic and opposition,195 and with some justification. Following the
amendment’s enactment, according to the GAO, “about 438,000 policies
nationwide had higher premiums immediately,”196 and some of the increases
were substantial. For example, many New Yorkers faced increases in their
annual flood insurance premiums of between $10,000 and $15,000.197 In
2013, one woman in Massachusetts “was hit with a $68,000 insurance
bill.”198
As a result of this political backlash, Biggert-Waters’s reforms were
short-lived. Opposition “culminated in the passage of the Homeowner Flood
Insurance Affordability Act of 2014[199] . . . which repealed many key
provisions of Biggert-Waters.”200 This Act “favors a more gradual increase
to full-risk premiums and thus softens the ‘blow’ of Biggert-Waters on
coastal homeowners.”201 “[P]olicyholders in high-risk areas who purchased
flood insurance after Biggert-Waters went into effect, and had to pay a fullrisk rate, are eligible for a refund under the Act.”202 Thus, after 2014, the
NFIP policy pendulum swung back to subsidizing coastal development,
obscuring again the true costs of living on the coast in an age of climate
change, rising seas, and worsening storms.
B.

The CBO’s Recommended Twelve Policy Approaches in 2017

In its September 2017 report on the NFIP, the CBO identified for
Congress twelve policy approaches that the reauthorization legislation could
take. The CBO grouped these suggestions into four categories—increase
receipts; reduce subsidies; shift costs away from the NFIP; and adjust
premiums to better reflect underlying risk factors—and evaluated them
against three potential congressional goals: improving the program’s
solvency; better aligning premiums and risk; and keeping costs low for
policyholders.203

195. Jenny Anderson, Outrage as Homeowners Prepare for Substantially Higher Flood
Insurance Rates, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/29/nyregion
/overhaul-and-a-hurricane-have-flood-insurance-rates-set-for-huge-increases.html.
196. Shweitzer, supra note 36, at 250.
197. Anderson, supra note 195.
198. Ella Nilsen, The National Flood Insurance Program was already $24 billion in Debt
Before Harvey and Irma, VOX (Sept. 11, 2017, 3:08 PM), https://www.vox.com/2017/8/26
/16208230/hurricane-harvey-flood-damage.
199. Pub. L. No. 113-89, 128 Stat. 1020 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4131(2014)).
200. Fox, supra note 22, at 208–09.
201. Shweitzer, supra note 36, at 251.
202. Id. at 252.
203. CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 68, at 23 tbl. 6.
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These potential congressional goals are, of course, tradeoffs; in
particular, as Biggert-Waters demonstrated, the goals of improving the
NFIP’s solvency and of keeping costs low for all policyholders are in
considerable tension. Thus, as might be expected, no single policy option
that the CBO suggested can achieve all three posited goals for the NFIP’s
reauthorization.204 For example, shortening the phase-out period for
discounted premium rates would improve the program’s solvency and better
align premium payments with actual risk, but this approach would increase
the costs to policyholders.205 In contrast, adjusting premium rates to reflect
the property’s actual value would better align premium payments with
actual risk and would keep costs low for owners of lower-value properties.
However, this approach does have drawbacks, because it would not improve
the program’s solvency, and rates could go up for owners of higher-value
properties.206 Recognizing that Congress has vacillated regarding its policy
priorities for the NFIP in the past,207 the CBO did not recommend any
particular course of action for the NFIP reauthorization.
C.

NFIP Reauthorization Efforts

In general, Congress reauthorizes the NFIP roughly every five years.
After its 2012 reauthorization, the NFIP was set to expire on September 30,
2017.208 Thus, Congress was expected to reauthorize the NFIP by the end of
September 2017. Instead, Congress has delayed the reauthorization process,
extending through and well beyond the highly destructive 2017 hurricane
season, potentially allowing that season to influence the reauthorization’s
substance. As of January 2019, the NFIP remains in reauthorization limbo,
while a series of congressional actions have repeatedly extended the
program’s effective date by a few months each time, ending (as of late
December 2018) on May 31, 2019.209 As a result, Congress allowed the
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See Pub. L. No. 115-56, § 130, 131 Stat. 1129 (2017) (extending the date from
September 30, 2017).
209. Id. (extending the NFIP to December 8, 2017); Bryn Stole, Congress Approves
Short-Term Extension for National Flood Insurance Program, ACADIANA ADVOC., (Dec. 7,
2017, 6:00 PM), http://www.theadvocate.com/acadiana/news/politics/article_5a8d0ffc-dba611e7-946c-9391fd96c07a.html (reporting the extension of the NFIP from December 8 to
December 22, 2017); Gloria Gonzalez, NFIP Extended to Jan. 19, BUS. INS. (Dec. 22, 2017,
11:40
AM),
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/00010101/NEWS06/912318110
/NFIP-extended-to-Jan-19 (reporting the extension of the NFIP to January 19, 2018); Jeffrey
Forbes, President Trump Extends National Flood Insurance Program, But Concerns Remain,
ECBM BLOG (Feb. 1, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://blog.ecbm.com/president-trump-extends-nfipnational-flood-insurance-program-2018 (reporting that on January 22 the NFIP was extended
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United States to enter the 2018 hurricane season without a fully reauthorized
NFIP—or a clear statement of what the potentially new requirements might
be. In the meantime, the 2018 hurricane season produced fifteen named
storms by the end of October, eight of which strengthened into hurricanes210
and two of which—Florence211 and Michael212—produced serious impacts in
the Carolinas and Florida, respectively. While the NFIP extensions provided
coverage to the victims of these storms, the 2018 hurricane season, like the
2017 hurricane season, prompted calls to rethink the NFIP.213
Notably, the House of Representatives acted on NFIP reuthorization,
perhaps setting the terms of the congressional reauthorization discussion that
will carry into the new Congress. On November 14, 2017, it passed House
Bill 2874, The 21st Century Flood Insurance Reform Act,214 by a 237-189
vote.215 While “[t]he House Financial Services Committee drafted the
legislation well before hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria ravaged the
southern coast of the United States and its territories[,] . . . the monster
storms added a new sense of urgency behind efforts to update the flood
insurance program.”216
House Bill 2874 would extend the NFIP for five years beyond its
original September 2017 expiration.217 It contains measures both to improve
the affordability of NFIP insurance and to more accurately reflect the risks
to February 8, 2018); Pub. L. No. 115-123, 132 Stat. 64 (2018) (extending all federal budgets
to March 23, 2018); Pub. L. No. 115-141, § 301, 132 Stat. 348, 1049 (2018) (extending the
NFIP to July 31, 2018); Pub. L. No. 115-225, § 1, 132 Stat. 1624 (2018) (extending the NFIP
to November 30, 2018); Pub. L. No. 115-281, § 1, 132 Stat. 4191 (2018) (extending the NFIP
to December 7, 2018); Pub. L. No. 115-396, § 1, 132 Stat. 5296 (2018) (extending the NFIP
to May 31, 2019, retroactive to December 7, 2018).
210. Chris Dolce, 5 Reasons the 2018 Hurricane Season Has Been Unusual, WEATHER
CHANNEL (Oct. 29, 2018), https://weather.com/storms/hurricane/news/2018-10-29-2018atlantic-hurricane-season-unusual/.
211. Hurricane Florence made landfall in North Carolina on September 14, 2018, and
may be “the worst flooding event in East Coast history.” Kevin Loria, Before-and-After
Satellite Photos Show the Staggering Amount of Water Hurricane Florence Dumped on
North Carolina, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 21, 2018, 4:12 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com
/hurricane-florence-damage-in-satellite-images-2018-9.
212. Florida Governor Rick Scott called Hurricane Michael the worst storm to hit the
Florida panhandle in a century. Morrigan McCarthy, Hurricane Michael: The Damage in
Pictures, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/11/us/photoshurricane-michael-damage.html.
213. E.g., Patrick Sisson, Flood Insurance Is Broken: Hurricane Florence Underscores
How Our Current System of Rebuilding After Storms Can’t Afford a Future of More Frequent
and Powerful Weather, CURBED (Sept. 20, 2018, 5:40 PM), https://www.curbed.com
/2018/9/20/17884382/hurricane-florence-storm-flood-climate-change-insurance.
214. H.R. 2874, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017).
215. Warmbrodt, supra note 174.
216. Id.
217. H.R. 2874, § 101 (extending the NFIP to September 22, 2017).
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to coastal properties. It also includes a variety of transparency measures
intended to ensure that property owners understand both their insurance
premiums and the flood risks they face.
Regarding affordability measures, House Bill 2874 first reduces the cap
on annual increases in premiums from 18% to 15%.218 It also authorizes
states to create flood insurance affordability programs for low-income
policyholders.219 After FEMA approves these subsidies, the cost would be
borne by other policyholders in the same state.220 In addition, the bill would
require FEMA to finalize a monthly installment premium payment plan first
required in the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014.221
Other measures in the bill encourage community-based222 and private flood
insurance,223 as well as flood damage savings accounts.224
Nevertheless, House Bill 2874 also contemplates that premiums for
coastal properties should, in general, reflect the real risks that those
properties face. For example, it requires the FEMA Administrator to
consider the differences between inland and coastal properties when
calculating premium rates.225 The revised premiums for coastal properties
would be implemented two years after the bill is enacted.226 In addition,
House Bill 2874 would allow premiums to be calculated not just based on
the flood maps, but also in light of “other risk assessment data and tools,
including risk assessment models and scores from appropriate sources.”227
Communities participating in the NFIP would have to develop and
implement community-specific plans to mitigate flood risks in areas
repeatedly damaged by floods,228 and repetitive-loss properties would be
subject to premium adjustments to reflect their flood risk, plus would have
to mitigate those risks to keep flood insurance available.229 However, for
other properties, House Bill 2874 would amend previous mitigation measure
provisions to allow a reduction in the risk premium rates for people who
employ such measures.230

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. § 102.
Id. § 103.
Id.
Id. § 106.
Id. § 110.
H.R. 2874, §§ 201-205.
Id. §§ 206-207.
Id. § 105(b) & (c).
Id. § 105(c).
Id. § 301(a)(2).
Id. § 402(c).
H.R. 2874, § 504(b) & (g).
Id. § 113(b).
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Finally, to increase transparency, House Bill 2874 would require that
FEMA disclose its methodology for calculating risk-based premiums.231 It
would also require the FEMA Administrator to clearly communicate for all
new and renewed policies the policyholders’ “full flood risk determinations”
and “the number and dollar value of claims for the property, over the life of
the property.”232 Current owners may also request any historical flood and
flood insurance information from FEMA, and FEMA must respond within
30 days.233 Most dramatically, House Bill 2874 requires state and local
governments to impose, “by statute or regulation, a duty on any seller or
lessor of improved real estate located [in a flood zone] to provide any
purchaser or lessee of such property a property flood hazard disclosure”234
that meets a list of federal disclosure requirements.235 If states and local
governments fail to comply, no new NFIP policies will be provided.236
Perhaps unsurprisingly, coastal interests object to the House’s
approach. Notably, “Republicans representing coastal districts urged their
colleagues to vote against the bill, warning it would make flood insurance
less affordable for their constituents and threaten the solvency of the
NFIP.”237 The bill sat with the Senate through the end of the last Congress,
and it remains to be seen what will happen with the NFIP reauthorization as
the new Congress takes up the task of governing. Nevertheless, House Bill
2874 modeled some good improvements to the NFIP, making the true risks
of building on the coast more transparent.
V. CONCLUSION
The 2017-2018 NFIP reauthorization process provided Congress with a
clear opportunity to update the NFIP for the realities that the United States’
coasts face in the 21st century, especially the increased risk of more frequent
and more severe coastal storms that flood coastal properties not previously
considered at such risk. With sufficient political will, Congress could still
reform the NFIP into an insurance program that both highlights these coastal
realities and educates Americans about the increasing risks that climate
change poses to the nation’s coasts. Whether Congress will make good use
of this opportunity, of course, remains an open question as the 2019
Congress returns to Washington.

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. § 104.
Id. § 107(a)(1).
Id. § 108(b).
Id. § 109(a).
H.R. 2874, § 109(b).
Id. § 109(a).
Warmbrodt, supra note 174.

2018]

HARVEY, IRMA, AND NFIP REAUTHORIZATION

511

Several aspects of House Bill 2874 represent important steps in
improving both the NFIP’s fiscal health in light of coastal storms and its
potential for incentivizing coastal adaptation. The bill would have allowed
different premium rates for coastal properties compared to inland properties,
allowing FEMA to more accurately charge coastal landowners for the flood
risks they face while simultaneously signaling the basic fact that many
coastal properties face greater risks than most inland properties. It would
have broadened the tools that FEMA could use in calculating flood risk,
which could include subsidence and erosion information and sea-level rise
projections for particular coastal locations, helping to transition the NFIP
from its traditional historical perspective to a recognition that the future will
not be like the past. The bill would also potentially have provided FEMA
with more effective means of dealing with areas and properties subject to
repeated flooding and loss.
Perhaps most important, House Bill 2874 would have helped to ensure
that both current and future coastal owners understand the flooding and
storm risks that their properties face, potentially helping to disincentivize
coastal development in the first place. John Nolon has argued that several
communities within the United States are already experiencing the bursting
of “climate change bubbles,” wherein property values plummet as the
adverse impacts of climate change become common knowledge.238 While
his case studies provide a range of examples of how climate change impacts
can affect property values, including drought and loss of water supply, most
involve excess water and flooding, including along the coasts.239 A
reauthorized NFIP that accelerated this process of public education about
climate change risk and property values could similarly accelerate the pace
at which buyers voluntarily choose not to purchase properties subject to
significant risk of flooding, including coastal properties at risk from
storms.240
Nevertheless, the NFIP reauthorization process has not yet fully
embraced all the realities either of the 2017 hurricane season or of climate
change, nor would House Bill 2874 have fully converted the NFIP into a
238. John R. Nolon, Land Use and Climate Change Bubbles: Resilience, Retreat, and
Due Diligence, 39 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 321, 32225 (2015).
239. Id. at 33750.
240. Notably, in June 2018, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) also
advocated for greater disclosure and transparency regarding flood risks, arguing both that
“[h]omeowners should have the right to know about their property’s history of flood
damages” and that “Congress should ensure greater accessibility and transparency of NFIP
data to accurately inform the broader public (including researchers, city planners, and
emergency responders) about flood risk.” Joel Scata, Hurricane Season Starts Without Flood
Insurance Reforms, NRDC: EXPERT BLOG (June 5, 2018), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/joelscata/hurricane-season-starts-without-flood-insurance-reforms.
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climate change adaptation law. First, both the 2017 and 2018 hurricane
seasons have taught us that many more properties are at risk from coastal
storms than the flood maps acknowledge. However, some of those
properties really are, still, only at risk during a “freak” or unusual (“1000year”) storm, while others are at risk in virtually every tropical storm
season. The NFIP could better differentiate these relative risks and, possibly,
expand the eligible pool of properties to include properties that could benefit
from flood insurance truly designed to protect against the rare catastrophe—
that is, “coastal” properties that, collectively over the long term, are likely to
pay far more in NFIP premiums that they require in payments (as is
generally the case with home casualty insurance).
Second, both the 2017 hurricane season and climate change in general
teach us that “risk” is now a rapidly evolving concept. As a result, the NFIP
reauthorization should require FEMA to update flood risks, particularly
along the coast, on a much more regular basis—perhaps even continually.
Moreover, these risk updates should take into account the latest and best
projections from climate scientists and coastal erosion and subsidence
experts to try to anticipate how flood risks along the coasts are changing,
rather than just “hindcasting” based on past experience.
Finally, in light of climate change, the NFIP should become a program
to encourage coastal retreat, particularly in areas already subject to repeated
flooding and destruction. I have suggested elsewhere that Congress consider
a “twice and out” policy that deems properties to be purchased by the
federal government when NFIP payouts reach twice the fair market value of
the property.241 Edward Richards, in contrast, has advocated for insuring
coastal properties according to a life insurance model.242 Other approaches
are possible,243 but to fully embrace its potential role in coastal climate
change adaptation, the NFIP must not only encourage migration away from
the riskiest coasts through information and financing but also require such

241. Robin Kundis Craig, Coastal Adaptation, Government Subsidized Insurance, and
Perverse Incentives to Stay, CLIMATIC CHANGE 1, 910 (on-line 02 May 2018), https://
link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-018-2203-5; https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-0182203-5.
242. Richards, supra note 13, at 428, 44460.
243. For example, the NRDC advocates for federal financial assistance to property
owners who wish to move:
Congress, through the NFIP, should direct FEMA to provide more assistance to
homeowners who would like to relocate, instead of repeatedly rebuilding after
every flood. Implementing such a program would empower homeowners to
escape the cycle of flooding and rebuilding, and would lessen the NFIP’s
financial exposure by removing some of these continuously-flooded properties
from its books.
Scata, supra note 240.
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migration when the federal government has fully paid for a repeat-loss
coastal property.

